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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper is concerned with the effect of outliers on predictions of the probability of tendering 
the lowest bid in sealed bid auctions.  Four of the leading models are tested relative to the equal 
probability model by an empirical analysis of three large samples of real construction contract 
bidding data via all-in (in-sample), one-out and one-on (out-of-sample) frames.  Outliers are 
removed in a sequence of cut-off values proportional to the standard deviation of bids for each 
auction.  A form of logscore is used to measure the ability to predict the probability of each 
bidder being the lowest.  The results show that, although statistically significant in some 
conditions, all the models produce rather poor predictions in both one-out and one-on mode, 
with the effects of outliers being generally small. 
 
Keywords: Bidding models, bidding theory, construction contracts, empirical tests, predicted 
probability, probability of lowest bid, sealed bid auctions, tendering theory, logscore test, 
outliers. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The probability of individual contestants winning a bidding auction can be a useful piece of 
information for many people, not least the contestants themselves.  Potential bidders can 
utilise this information to decide in which auctions to participate, when to try to obtain an 
invitation to participate, whether to enter a bid and, if so, the dollar value of the bid.  
Similarly, the auctioneer can also utilise the information in deciding when and how to hold 
the auction, how many and which bidders to invite, and the criterion for determining the 
winner. 
 
Most of the literature on the subject is concerned with setting a price, x, so that the 
probability, Pr(x), of winning the auction reaches some desired level.  Several models have 
been proposed for predicting Pr(x), and these have been subject to quite lengthy, but as yet 
inconclusive, discussion based on the theoretical merits of each model.  Most of the empirical 
studies that have taken place have concentrated on fitting a single underlying probability 
density function to all bids, including the uniform (Fine and Hackemar, 1970; Whittaker, 
1970; Grinyer and Whittaker, 1973), normal (McCaffer, 1976; Skitmore, 1986) and gamma 
(Friedman, 1956; Hossein, 1977) while recent work (Skitmore, 2001; Skitmore and Lo, 2002) 
uses the single underlying density approach in examining the effects of removing potential 
outliers - finding the truncated lognormal to be the best fit followed by the truncated normal 
distribution, with the uniform distribution way behind. 
 
A great deal of attention has centred at the theoretical level on the actions of individual 
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competitors, information about which has been regarded as "critical" (Griesmer et al, 1967).  
Most models implicitly require the analyst to develop probability distributions for each 
competitor's bid (de Neufville et al, 1977), which means that the model builder is faced with the 
problem of explicating probability laws for opposing bids (Weverbergh, 1981), and often with a 
palpable lack of empirical supporting evidence.  Skitmore’s (1991) multivariate model provides 
a good solution to this, although at the cost of a parametric assumption in the form of a 
composite density.  Friedman's (1956) model, on the other hand, is particularly susceptible 
demanding, as it does, the collection of bid/cost estimate ratios against each competitor in order 
to construct frequency distributions of sufficient dimension to enable probability density 
functions to be fitted.  This difficulty can be partly overcome by recourse to the single 
underlying density assumption - only certain bidders for which a good quantity of data is 
available being treated individually (Capen et al, 1971; Curtis and Maines, 1973; Fuerst, 1977; 
Morin and Clough, 1969; for instance).  Assumptions of this kind can be misleading, however, 
as it has been shown that differences in assumptions of the spreads of opposing bids can have 
significant effects on results (Carr, 1982; Weverbergh, 1982, p.26). 
 
All the work mentioned so far has been concerned with model fitting.  The main issue here, 
however, is the degree to which the models are able to predict events.  For bidding models, one 
event of importance is the probability of entering the lowest bid in a future auction.  The main 
interest, therefore, is in the goodness of the forecast of this probability.  Until recently, there 
have been no empirical tests of this in construction contract bidding, presumably due to the lack 
of development of appropriate tests.  This situation has now changed, with the application of a 
form of logarithmic scoring function to assess the main models proposed in the literature 
(Skitmore, 2002).  However, work on the effects of outliers (Skitmore, 2001; Skitmore & Lo, 
2002) suggests that significant improvements might be possible through their removal and this 
has yet to be examined. 
 
This paper, therefore, further develops the Skitmore (2002) approach to enable the examination 
of effects of potential outliers on the main models found in the literature. 
 
 
MODELS, DATA, TESTING FRAMES AND OUTLIER REMOVAL 
 
• The five models investigated comprise: (1) Friedman’s (1956) model; (2) Gates’ (1967) 
model; (3) Carr’s (1982) model; and (4) two versions of Skitmore’s (1991) model.  These 
were tested for superiority over Pim’s (1974) equal probability model. 
• Three datasets were used, termed ,  and .  and are the same as 
and  respectively in Skitmore (2002).  is a set of data for a series of Hong Kong 
construction contracts. 
• The three testing frames are termed all-in (in-sample), one-out and one-on (out-of-
sample). 
 
The models, testing frames and  and  data are described in detail in Skitmore (2002) 
including the necessary modifications that had to be made due to the limitations of the data 
and nature of the analysis.  The method of outlier removal is described in Skitmore (2001).  A 
summary is provided in the Appendix. 
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TESTS  
 
Background 
 
The only method available at the present time for assessing the accuracy of probability 
predictions is Dowe et al’s (1996) scoring method, devised to test the accuracy of Australian 
football tipsters.  It is therefore designed for a two-person/team zero-sum game in which team 
A either wins (in which case team B loses) or team A loses (in which case team B wins).  The 
Dowe et al scoring method is: 
 
Score (if A wins) = 1+log2p, or (if A loses) = 1+log2(1-p)  
 
where p is the tipsters’ predicted probability of A winning.  Thus, if the tipsters predict the 
probability of A winning as 1, and A wins, then they are assigned a score of 1+log2 = 1.  If A 
loses, on the other hand, they receive a score of 1+log2(0) = ∞.  Similarly, if they predict the 
probability of A winning as 0, and A wins, then they are assigned a score of 1+log2(0)= ∞.  If 
A loses, on the other hand, they receive a score of 1+log2 = 1.  So, if we average the tipsters’ 
scores over a series of trials, the one with the significantly lowest average score can be 
adjudged the winner (Dowe et al make no reference to significance). 
 
For construction contractors’ predicted probabilities of winning, it is necessary to extend this 
method to more than 2 teams.  A few alternatives are available.  One is, following the spirit of 
the Dowe et al game, just to test the prediction of the winner and ignore the other k-1 
predictions in a k-bidder auction.  A better way though, and one that is more suitable to 
testing bidding models where all the bidders results are of interest, is to test the probability 
prediction of each bidder. 
 
To do this, we first write Dowe et al’s formula as:  
 
 ( ) ( )iiii pp −−++ 1log1log1 22 pipi  
 
where ipi  is the actual result ( ipi =1 if bidder i wins and ipi =0 if bidder i doesn’t win).  So, for 
all the bidders in a k-bidder auction we get the auction score: 
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=
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k
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Significance 
 
Significance is, by definition, the probability of a chance result occurring.  A chance result in 
this case, occurs when all chances of winning bidders are equiprobable, ie., p1=p2=…pn = 1/k. 
 Thus, the expected value of the logscore for a chance result is, from (1): 
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which is, expanded: 
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Significance can, therefore, be assessed by the departure of S from Se and will vary according 
to k.  To make S independent of k, we can standardise by dividing (3) into (1), ie.,  
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Characteristics 
 
Eqn (4) has some nice characteristics for assessing bidding probability predictions: 
 
 
Prediction model Ss 
Best possible prediction 
iip pi=  0 
Equiprobable prediction kppp k /1...21 ====  1 
Worst possible prediction 
iip pi−= 1  ∞  
Zero’s prediction 0...21 ==== kppp  ∞  
Unitary prediction 1...21 ==== kppp  ∞  
 
Note: with most of the other alternatives tried, predicting a zero probability for all bidders 
scores unreasonably well due to being incorrect for only one bidder. 
 
 
Simplification 
 
Eqn (4) simplifies, seemingly without loss, by removing the 1+ and freeing the log base 
(Dowe et al describes the rationale for the 1+ as to avoid psychological problems in playing a 
game where the winner is closest to zero!), ie.,  
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Comparing datasets 
 
Eqn (5) gives the standardised Dowe et al score of a single auction.  To compare datasets just 
involves averaging Ss over all auctions for each dataset, ie.,  
 
 ∑=
c
j
sjs S
c
S
1*  (6) 
 
where there are j=1,2,…,c auctions in the dataset, each comprising kj bids. 
 
To compare different models, *sS  is calculated for each  and sample-frame - lower values 
indicating better predictions than high values.  As there are no statistical tests that indicate the 
significance of these differences, values were generated by computer simulation to obtain the 
approximate 5% percentage points for each , sample frame and outlier cut-off value. 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Fig 1a-c shows the best all-in frame results for the five models (F, G, C, S1 and S2 
representing the Friedman, Gates, Carr and the two Skitmore models respectively) in 
comparison with the Pim equal probability model (E) for q=1,2, ..., 30 with outlier removal 
cut-off values of –0.5, -0.4, …, 3.0 for .  This shows all the models, especially 
Friedman and Gates, performing well (ie., below unity) for and  with the best 
results occurring without the removal of outliers.  The results for the  dataset, 
however, with a much greater average number of bidders per auction, are much worse, with 
Friedman’s model being particularly poor. 
 
Fig 2a-c shows the equivalent one-out frame results and Fig2 3a-c the equivalent one-on frame 
results.  These show the models offer little improvement on equal probability in ex-post 
forecasting- with the Friedman’s model performing particularly poorly. 
 
Whilst improvement in ex-post forecasting on the equal probability model is clearly at best 
marginal, it is of interest to see the extent to which these marginal improvements are 
significant.  By generating random values for each auction and repeating the analysis many 
times, it is possible to approximate the 5% significance values for each of the five sets of ex-
post results.  Comparing these with the values shown in Figs 2 and 3 enables the significant 
results to be identified (Table 1).  One point of interest in these results is that the majority 
were obtained for q≥10, ie., the best results occurred when grouping together bidders with 
more than 10 bids in the database.  Of course, setting q to a very high value would result in all 
bidders being treated as equal and thus equiprobable.  With the sparse bidding matrices that 
occur with these datasets (and, typically, construction contract auction datasets in general), 
q≥10 involves an amount of grouping that is getting quite close to this and hence explains the 
closeness of the results to the equal probability model. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
 
Previous work in auction bidding has largely been carried out without any real supporting 
data.  In the context of construction contract auction bidding, it has been doubted that 
sufficient data can be mustered for each bidder for any effective predictions to be made.  In 
analysing some real and typical sets of construction contract auction bid data it has been 
possible to compare the major models here against pure chance, showing that at best only a 
marginal improvement on chance seems possible.  
 
Of particular interest, however, is the extent to which grouping provides the best results in the 
analysis, with most involving q≥10 where q is a function of the number of bids made by each 
competitor.  This is essentially the Friedman/Gates grouping criterion.  Other a priori 
grouping criteria are possible, such as size and workload of the bidder or the size and type of 
project, and which may produce better results.  Alternatively, it should be possible to group 
bidders empirically in such a way as to produce the best expost logscores - to enable bidder 
groupings to be revealed rather than predetermined.  Some preliminary work suggests that 
very substantial improvements may be made by using this latter approach. 
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APPENDIX: MODELS, DATA AND TESTING FRAMES 
 
Models 
 
Letting X1, X2, … , Xk be independently distributed random variables then, if we generate one 
value, ie., x1, x2, … ,xk from each variable, the probability, .iP , of xi being the lowest is given 
by 
 
 dxxSxfP
k
ij
j
jii )()(
1
. ∫ ∏
∞
∞−
≠
=
=  (A1) 
where Sj (x) is the well-known survivor function  ∫
∞
x
j dyyf )( .  For the Friedman model, fi (x) 
has zero variance; for the Gates model, a proportional hazard function is used (Skitmore & 
Pettitt, in press), enabling Sj(x) to be replaced with [ ] ijji PPi xS )( where ijP  is the probability that 
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xi<xj, so that (A1) reduces to
∑
≠
=
−
+
=
k
ij
j ij
ij
i
P
P
P
1
. 1
1
1
; for the Carr model, f ( ) is the normal density 
with equal variances; and for the Skitmore model, f( ) is lognormal. 
 
 
(1) Equal probability model 
 
The equal probability model, as implied by Pim, directly predicts each bidder's probability of 
being the lowest bidder as 1/k.  Of course, the same result is obtained when all bids are 
identically and independently distributed.  This is essentially the control model representing 
chance.  A good model should, of course, outperform the equal probability model by 
definition. 
 
 
(2) Friedman’s model 
 
Friedman’s approach is to transform xi by dividing by the reference bidder’s cost estimates, 
c1, i.e., 
 
 xi
F
 = xi/c1 (A2) 
 
the shape and other distribution parameters for xi
F
 being estimated from the frequency 
distribution of the xi
F
 ratios for each competitor.  x1
F
 is however assigned the arbitrary 
parameter values µ1= x*/c* and σ12 = 0, where x* and c* are the reference bidder’s bid and 
cost estimate for the next auction. 
 
Friedman’s approach relies heavily on the availability of data, the theoretical density 
functions being fitted provided there are data for “enough previous contracts”.  A range of 
criterion values was used to determine this, ie., q=1,2,...,30, where q denotes the minimum 
number of previous bidding encounters between the reference bidder and a specific 
competitor.  Where the actual number of previous bidding encounters between the reference 
bidder and a specific competitor was less than q, the probability was estimated as the mean 
'success', p , of the reference bidder against all other bidders, ie., 
 
 ∑
=
=
'
1'
1 n
j
ijP
n
p  (A3) 
 
Pij being estimated by the ratio of the number of previous auctions where bidder i’s cost 
estimates were less than bidder j‘s bids to the total number of auctions where bidder i bid 
against bidder j.  Where no previous meetings of a pair of bidders had taken place, each 
bidder in the pair was assigned a 0.5 probability of underbidding the other. 
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To enable Pi. to be estimated for all bidders, the bidder i’s cost estimate values were 
substituted with the bid value in Friedman’s parameter estimation procedure and in 
computing Pij . Similarly, the constant x*/c* was modified to x*/x* = 1. 
 
 
(3) Gates’ model 
 
Gates’ approach is to estimate Pi. directly, by the formula 
∑
≠
=
−
+
=
k
ij
j ij
ij
i
P
P
P
1
. 1
1
1
 
Gates' model is recommended for use in situations where there is "sufficient bidding data 
relating to every competitor bidder on the particular job".  As with Friedman’s model, a range 
of q values was tried and the same procedure used where less than q meetings occurred.  To 
enable Pi. to be estimated for all bidders, cost estimates were again substituted by bid values. 
 
 
(4) Carr’s model 
 
Carr uses Friedman’s transformation for xi and x1 where, in addition, x1 is also substituted by 
c1, resulting in the transformation 
 
 x1
C
 = c1/ lc  (A4) 
 
The arbitrary assumption that the xi
F
 and x1
C
 are normally and homogeneously (equal 
variances) distributed then allows the straightforward estimation of the required parameters 
from the frequency distribution of the pooled xi
F
 ratios. 
 
Carr’s approach presents no difficulty in handling sparse data as normality and homogeneity 
are assumed.  The only change made was to again substitute the cost estimates c1 with the 
bids x1 to enable all bidder’s Pi. estimates to be made.  Bidders with less than q data points 
were assigned equal probabilities (1/k). 
 
(5) Skitmore’s model 
 
Skitmore’s approach uses approximate maximum likelihood estimates to fit the model yij ~ 
N(αi+βj, si2) to the transformed values yij = ln(xij-mx(1)j) where m is a constant with 
0.5<m<0.9 (x(1)j being the value of the lowest bid for the jth auction) and N( ) is the Normal 
probability density function.   The probability prediction for y1 
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is then obtained by substituting the estimates αi and si into µi and σi respectively . 
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The model is difficult to apply in this form however as it involves the additional estimation of 
x(1).  More recently, Skitmore and Pemberton (1994) circumvented this problem by recourse 
to a simple natural log transformation, ie. xi
S
 = lnxi, and this was also used here.  From this, 
the probability of each bidder winning is computed.  In cases where there was less than q data 
points for a bidder, that bidder was assigned an average α and s value. 
 
The Skitmore model treats bidders with a single data point (one recorded previous bid) as 
having an alpha value based on that bid.  A modification was also used which assigns these 
bidders with the average alpha value of all other bidders.  The simple natural log 
transformation was again used. 
 
 
Data 
 
Three sets of data, termed here , were analysed. 
 
The  data comprised a donated set from a north of England County Council for 
building contract bids over approximately four years prior to July 1982.  The resulting 
number of contracts for which a full set of bids, together with the identity of the bidder, was 
available for analysis totalled 218. 
 
The data comprised a donated set from a construction company operating in the 
London area.  They covered much of the company's building contract bidding activities 
during a twelve month period in the early 1980's and comprised 51 auctions for which a full 
set of bids, together with the identity of each bidder.  These were supplemented by a similar 
set of 373 auctions obtained from the records of a bidding information agency in the London 
area for the period November 1976 to February 1977. 
 
The data were obtained from the Hong Kong Architectural Services Department for  
their building contract bids for the period November 1990 to November 1996.  The resulting 
number of contracts for which a full set of bids, together with the identity of the bidder, was 
available for analysis totalled 267. 
 
 
Testing frames 
 
As the sole purpose of bidding models is for use in forecasting future outcomes, it is 
necessary to apply the models to out-of-sample data in addition to the in-sample data.  Three 
forecast sample-testing frames are applied: (1) the all-in frame, (2) the one-out frame and (3) 
the one-on frame 
 
 
The all-in frame 
 
The all-in frame comprises all the data used to build the model.  The testing procedure then 
simply tests the model against the data from which the model was built.  In a similar way to 
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the regression coefficient of determination, the error rate for all-in frame analysis is an 
unrealistically low measure of forecasting ability due to the self-fulfilling nature of the 
procedure. 
 
 
The one-out frame 
 
The one-out frame involves the use of the cross-validation procedure, by which the first 
auction is omitted from the model building process - the resulting model being applied to the 
omitted auction - this procedure being repeated, with replacement, for all the auctions in the 
 set.  Cross validation provides a reasonably realistic simulated out-of-sample test 
provided no significant time, or sequencing, effects are involved.  The method is equivalent to 
the regression deleted residual analysis 
 
 
The one-on frame 
 
The one-on frame provides a simulation that is perhaps the closest to forecasting reality.  A 
small sample of, say 13 auctions is used to build a model, which is then applied to the 14th 
auction - this procedure being repeated with 14 auctions to build the model which is applied 
to the 15th auction, etc.  Of course, if the model performs better than chance, the results tend 
to improve as the number of auctions used to build the model increases.  The final model, 
which incorporates all except the last auction, coincides with the final one-out model.  The 
one-out frame results are therefore indicative of the final stages of the one-on results. 
 
 
Outlier removal 
 
Skitmore (2001) examined six methods of outlier removal comprising: (1) highest k’ bids, (2) 
highest k-m bids, (3) bids higher than the average bid plus x1 times the standard deviation, (4) 
bids x2 times higher than the mean bid, (5) bids higher than x3 times the lowest bid, and (6) 
highest x4% bids.  These were applied systematically to all the auctions in six datasets, with the 
resulting reduced number of bids being tested graphically for conformity with the uniform, log 
uniform, normal and censored and uncensored  lognormal distributions.  This showed the 
uncensored lognormal to be the most appropriate distribution and method (3) to be the best 
censoring method, in terms of minimum number of outliers removed – a result confirmed 
statistically in a later analysis by Skitmore and Lo (2002), which showed method (3) to also be 
the best for producing the normal distribution.  For the work described here, where homogeneity 
of bidders is not assumed, the amount of computations involved was such as to prohibit a full 
examination of all six methods.  Instead, just method (3) was used on the grounds of its 
previous success – the cut-off being applied in successive multiples of the original standard 
deviation of the auction bids. 
Model 
One-out    
E - - - 
F - - - 
G  0.7 to 1.0 0.6 to 3.0 
C  0.1 to 3.0 
0.1 
0.3 
0.5 
S1  -0.1 to 3.0 -0.5 
S2  
-0.1 to 0.1 
0.4 
0.6 to 3.0 
- 
One-on    
E - - - 
F - - - 
G - - 
0.1 to 0.2 
0.4 to 0.5 
0.9 to 1.4 
C - 0.6 to 1.8 - 
S1 
-0.4 to –0.3 
0.0 to 0.7 
1.1 to 1.2 
1.3 to 1.7 
0.7 to 3.0 -0.4 to 0.0 
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0.0 to 0.1 
Table 1: Significant results
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Fig 1b: Case B all-in results
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Fig 1c: Case C all-in results
Cut-off
L
o
g
s
c
o
r
e
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
-0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
E
F
G
C
S1
S2
 
Fig 2a: Case A one-out results
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Fig 2b: Case B one-out results
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Fig 2c: Case C one-out results
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Fig3a: Case A one-on results
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Fig 3b: Case B one-on results
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Table 3c: Case C one-on results
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